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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the issue of cybersecurity in 
the global maritime system. The maritime system is a 
set of interconnected infrastructures that facilitates 
trade across major bodies of water. Covered here are 
the problem of protecting maritime traffic from attack 
as well as how cyberattacks change the equation for 
securing commercial shipping from attack on the 
high seas. The authors ask what cyberattack aimed at 
maritime targets – ships, ports, and other elements –
looks like and what protections have been emplaced 
to counter the threat of cyberattack upon the 
maritime system.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
International maritime operations remain a 
primary vehicle of globalization. More than 80 
percent of the world’s cargo is carried by ship. While 
mobile phones and other small, lightweight, highly-
valuable items may go by air, almost everything else 
traveling from continent-to-continent is transported 
by maritime vessels. Shipping remains a fundamental 
component to global trade, wherein ports large and 
small serve as the departure and arrival point for 
containerized, bulk, and liquid cargo. 
Transport by ship has become a deeply automated 
process in which computers are employed in 
everything from navigation and propulsion to cargo 
handling and customs. Increasingly, the computers 
involved in maritime cargo operations are also 
networked, largely employing the same protocols as 
other Internet-based forms of communication [1]. 
This rise in networked computerization in ships and 
in systems that support shipping from onshore 
present new opportunities for malicious parties to 
disrupt maritime commerce in ways that piracy and 
open naval hostilities cannot. 
Cyberattacks may be launched across global 
distances and can have potentially devastating 
impact. They can’t necessarily be steered around as 
with threats like regional conflict or piracy. 
Nonetheless, we argue the threat of cyberattack is 
real and prompts us to answer several questions. 
First, we ask how does cyberattack threaten the 
global system of maritime enabled commerce? 
Second, we investigate the cyber threat to maritime 
system. In our third and last thrust of inquiry, we 
attempt to identify what norms, standards, practices, 
and law may be needed to protect the system of 
global maritime commerce from cyberattack as well 
as practical prescriptions for US public policy as well 
as international policy. 
Before moving on to discussion of international 
security antecedents to cyber issues found in this 
area, there is a matter of definitional housekeeping. 
The authors prefer to use the term maritime system to 
define the operational space in which shipborne and 
port activities take place, principally for commercial 
purposes. US Coast Guard (USCG) and Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) documents describe a 
Maritime Transport System (MTS) that encompasses 
much area where cybersecurity issues are to be found 
in the maritime system, but not necessarily all of it. 
DHS’s definition extends to ports and coastal 
authorities but not necessarily ships plying the seas 
far from US territory. 
For centuries, states have pursued control of the 
seas, often in competition or conflict with one 
another. While two great powers, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, have exerted much 
effort to control the seas and allow for the free flow 
of trade on the world’s oceans, other powers have 
contested their (mostly) benevolent hegemony for the 
seas [2]. Ahistorical perspectives on maritime 
security are likely foolish while thinking about 
cybersecurity issues as cyberattacks may well 
achieve results previously ascribed to warships, 
privateers, or pirates on the high seas.  
 
2. Seaborne Commerce and Sea Control: 
Lessons from the Last Century  
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Disruption of shipping activity is often 
fundamental component of naval conflict [3]. In both 
world wars, submarine campaigns represented a 
mortal threat to multiple powers, but not least the 
island nations of the Axis and Allied coalitions. In 
the Second World War, it could be argued that one 
submarine campaign, Germany’s in the Atlantic, 
ultimately failed, though at great cost to the Allies, 
while another, the United States’ campaign against 
Japanese merchant shipping, was a success. For 
decades after the war, the United States and its 
NATO allies prepared for a clash of naval forces and 
doctrine in the North Atlantic. 
There the issue was to what degree NATO’s 
naval forces – surface ships, submarines, and aircraft 
– could protect a massive reinforcement from North 
America to Europe. It was assumed that the Soviet 
Union would sortie hundreds of submarines and 
surface warships to disrupt the Alliance’s maritime 
link. How well the respective strategies of NATO and 
the Soviet Union would have fared remains a well-
educated guess, but few estimates were particularly 
rosy with regard to the fortunes of merchantmen on 
the North Atlantic in a potential war with the Soviet 
Union [4]. Nonetheless, in 1986 Mearsheimer argued, 
“the Navy‘s main value for deterrence lies in the 
realm of sea control, where protection of NATO’s sea 
lines of communication (SLOCs) might matter to 
Soviet decision-makers contemplating war in 
Europe” [5] 
While no major war between East and West 
came to pass between 1945 and 1989, regional 
conflicts did have an impact on international 
maritime commerce. Perhaps most important of them 
was the closure of the Suez Canal from 1967 to 1975. 
Shut at the onset of the June 1967 Six Day War, 
Israeli and Egyptian troops faced off across the 120 
mile-long waterway between the Mediterranean and 
Red Seas until 1973’s Three Day War. The canal was 
ultimately reopened as relations improved between 
Cairo and Tel Aviv in 1975. The canal’s closure 
increased the distance of a sea journey from Mumbai 
to London from 6,200 nautical miles to more than 
10,800 nm. Feyrer argues persuasively how closure 
of Suez led to significant reduction in trade between 
nations on either side of it [6, 7]. 
Despite being the last naval conflict of its kind, 
the 1982 War over the Falkland Islands had minimal 
impact on international seaborne commerce, during 
the war between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988 
merchant ships involved in the export of oil from 
both belligerents were attacked more 450 times [8]. 
Both sides sought to interdict their opponent’s 
capacity to sell oil internationally thereby acquiring 
funds to continue the war effort. US intervention in 
the Persian Gulf during the conflict ultimately led to 
the crippling of two warships, the Stark (hit by Iraqi 
missiles) and Samuel B. Roberts (which struck an 
Iranian mine). US protection of commercial shipping 
illustrated that such duty remained dangerous and 
unpredictable, however punitive attacks on Iranian 
forces after the damaging of the Roberts largely 
curtailed Iran’s capacity to harm US or allied 
commercial vessels. 
Absent major international conflict, disruption to 
maritime commerce has arisen in new forms. 
Somalia’s incapacity to exert control over her littorals 
during the country’s slide to largely ungoverned 
status in the 1990s led to a resurgence in maritime 
piracy in the 2000s. Regional warlords and bandits 
engaged in a significant piracy campaign, involving 
the hijacking of dozens of vessels, some held for 
periods of years for ransoms in excess of $1 million. 
However, coordinated international response as well 
as military operations onshore have had a desired 
result of reducing the Somali pirate problem to a 
negligible one [9]. 
 
3. Cybersecurity and the Maritime 
System 
 
When we think of piracy on the high seas, it is a 
mostly unsophisticated endeavor. A few men, armed 
with rocket propelled grenades and Kalashnikovs, 
possessing boarding gear and a fast boat are usually 
all that is needed to highjack a vessel displacing 
50,000 tons or more (naval vessels excepted). 
Ransoms for these hijacked ships has reached well 
into the millions of dollars. 
How cyberattack may disrupt shipping is 
different. To get our arms around cyber threats, we 
need to begin using some imagination as to what is 
requisite for a pulling off a cyberattack that either 
steals something of value or does damage to a 
maritime vessel or other piece of infrastructure. The 
authors like to consider the beginning point of 
thinking about such attacks as the bad guy-ology of 
the attacker. 
What does this mean? When we speak of bad 
guys in cyberspace, we are talking about people who 
can act alone, in small groups or large ones, 
supported or deployed by nation states or not. They 
craft source code for sophisticated tooling, penetrate 
computer networks, and do a lot of the same data 
management work as most Internet enterprises 
(servers, databases, means of communication, etc.) 
also toil in [10]. 
We have witnessed reports of computer security 
breakdown in the face of increasingly sophisticated 
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attack for more than 20 years now. This has been 
going on for a long time. Hackers and, equally 
importantly, hacker groups have been around for a 
while and they have evolved within both domestic 
and international political spheres. They have power. 
A former member of the Cult of the Dead Cow (cDc) 
hacker organization ran a Democratic campaign for 
one Texas’s US Senate seats in 2018. 
Concurrently, there has been a convergence of 
politics and cyberattack that extends from “kinetic” 
hacks like the Stuxnet campaign launched against 
Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and the 
information warfare operation exemplified by the 
email breach at the US Democratic National 
Committee by foreign, state-supported hackers. 
Those individuals, in the employ of Russia leaked 
stolen data to the Wikileaks organization during the 
2016 US Presidential election. Both these episodes 
illustrate how important or impactful cyberattacks 
have been and what breaks when they occur. 
Thus when we begin thinking about cyber 
vulnerabilities in the maritime sector, we need to 
focus firstly on what happens when things break [11]. 
There is an exercise afoot in which mapping 
vulnerabilities to components are linked to pieces of 
information and computing infrastructure. We may 
not need to worry about a pump that can only be 
turned on by a human being, but one operated by 
computer and interconnected by network, we do 
worry about.  
Where cybersecurity concerns come into play is 
after identifying things that could go wrong, i.e. that 
also are very detrimental to safety or continuation of 
operation. There need to be many people thinking 
about what can go wrong in shipping as with any 
piece of critical infrastructure. It may seem simple, 
but the computerization of it is not. 
Furthermore, it must be reminded just how 
important maritime trade is to the global economy 
and what disruptions to it may produce in global 
manufacturing or energy supply chains. Hopefully 
this answers the question of why cybersecurity in the 
maritime system is important. It’s important because 
of how closely seaborne trade tracks with world GDP 
and other economic indicators. Trade on the oceans 
exceeds 10 billion tons per year [12]. With many 
nations highly dependent on forms of import or 
export, disruption of those flows could be potentially 
useful to adversaries or enemies. In a time of 
increased economic conflict, could the cyber weapon 
not be employed against the maritime system? Of 
course, and it already has.  
The Stuxnet or Shamoon of the maritime system, 
thus far is the cyberattack against Denmark’s Møller-
Maersk, the world’s largest container ship operator. 
But Maersk is not just the biggest in container 
shipping, it also operates the ports themselves, 
including the Port of Los Angeles, the busiest port by 
container volume in the US. Maersk was also the 
victim of the most expensive and destructive 
cyberattack against any form of logistics company in 
June 2017. 
The company’s IT infrastructure was walloped 
by the propagation of the NotPetya malware across 
its computer networks. It was crippled by the attack, 
which shut down port operations – cranes, gates, 
freight forwarding instructions, and many, many 
other processes, at 17 of the company’s 76 ports. 
After the attack, “For days to come, one of the 
world’s most complex and interconnected distributed 
machines, underpinning the circulatory system of the 
global economy itself, would remain broken” [13]. 
With Maersk’s woes as a backdrop, thinking 
about the bad guy-ology of cyberattack in the 
maritime system is shaped by two avenues for action. 
First is beginning with a desired impact of an attack, 
perhaps misidentifying cargo containers to facilitate 
smuggling. The second relates to systems’ exposure 
to attack and how vulnerabilities may be exploited to 
produce a desired effect. So, we can start with two 
general types of questions. One is, “If I want to 
disrupt x with some form of cyberattack, how do I do 
it?” But also important is, “If I can see a vulnerability 
on resource y, what can I do with it?” 
Returning to the Maersk case, it has been largely 
judged to be a victim of a cyberattack spilling over 
from the years’ long conflict between Russia and her 
former sister republic, Ukraine. So the enormously 
costly attack on Maersk was the collateral damage of 
a Russian-sponsored attack on a country more than 
1,500 kilometers from Maersk’s headquarters in 
Copenhagen. So for as much damage and distress as 
NotPetya visited upon Maersk, it wasn’t the intended 
target. We are left to wonder what damage an attack 
with some intent and planning might do to another 
major shipper and operator of ports. 
Moving forward, we need to chronicle the places 
in which bad things can happen by cyber means and 
categorize them to some degree. The apparent 
dichotomy for maritime cybersecurity is a divide 
between operations at sea and those undertaken while 
in port. This is a useful distinction as the level of data 
connectivity for ships at sea is far more constrained 
than for other pieces of the maritime system 
functioning at pier-side and further inland. While 
ports and their IT infrastructure largely benefit from 
connectivity to high-speed, backbone Internet 
networks, ships at sea do not. They rely almost 
exclusively on satellite connectivity to transmit and 
receive data, and that connectivity is vastly 
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expensive. But let us begin with the cyber issues 
faced by ships at sea. 
 
3.1 Cyber Issues for Maritime Vessels 
 
Navigation by stars and sextant has been largely 
abandoned by the world’s mariners. Most ships ply 
the world’s sea lanes with the aid of three computer-
driven systems: the automatic identification system 
(AIS); the global positioning system (GPS); and the 
Electronic Chart Display Information System 
(ECDIS). These three systems are the pillars of 
computerized navigation for merchant shipping 
today.  
“AIS is a non-encrypted transponder responsible 
for transmitting course, speed, type of vessel, type of 
cargo, at-anchor or underway status; and other 
information for safety at sea” [14]. AIS transponders 
have been required of ocean-going vessels since 
2002, however the functionality of AIS has been 
subverted for a variety of purposes. Substantial 
evidence exists that Iran switches off AIS 
transponders to facilitate sanctions evading behavior 
in its export of crude oil. North Korea also allegedly 
disables AIS ostensibly to allow its merchant vessels 
a greater degree of latitude in avoiding sanctions. 
Also important to maritime navigation is GPS. 
Its use makes navigation on the high seas far more 
accurate and simple than ever before. As long as a 
merchant vessel can communicate with satellites of 
GPS system, its location can usually be pinpointed 
within a few meters. GPS is also employed in 
military targeting, and as a result, measures able to 
confuse, block, or spoof GPS signals have appeared. 
The US Coast Guard issued an alert regarding a 2015 
incident in which a loss of GPS connectivity to 
multiple ships departing a non-US port occurred. In 
2017, multiple vessels observed degradation and loss 
of GPS connectivity while sailing in the Black Sea. 
Of all the systems of concern with regard to 
cyberattack, perhaps none is more worrisome than 
ECDIS. As it is a system that interfaces with 
navigational gear, sensors, and control systems for 
driving the ship, ECDIS represents a highly-
dangerous target to cyberattack. Even bad ECDIS 
data is a significant issue. The US Navy minesweeper 
Guardian was severely grounded off the Philippines 
in 2013 largely due because, “leadership and watch 
teams relied primarily on an inaccurate Digital 
Nautical Chart (DNC) coastal chart during planning 
and execution of the navigation plan” [15]. In 
addition, multiple cybersecurity and maritime 
publications have reported on ECDIS’s susceptibility 
to manipulation by unauthorized parties, possibly 
leading to grounding or collision. 
In addition to the major navigational systems 
present aboard contemporary merchant vessels, there 
is an enormous amount of automation in shipboard 
operations. Contemporary cargo vessels, including 
the largest ones, have automated away large numbers 
of crew. Large merchant vessels displacing upwards 
of 100,000 tons are now operated by crews as small 
as 10 persons or less. The computer systems that 
replace crew members are process control systems, 
often provided by automation firms servicing 
multiple sectors. 
One of them is Schneider Electric, a French firm 
that offers products in no less than 11 merchant 
shipping applications. Schneider’s products are 
germane to this paper as its Triconex® brand of 
process control software is widely-utilized in 
industrial applications in a variety of sectors. 
Unfortunately, it was also allegedly compromised by 
a cyberattack in a petrochemical facility in Saudi 
Arabia. Shipboard systems likely contain a 
significant number of vulnerabilities, and while they 
can’t be attacked in the way cable- and fiber-based 
networks are, there are plenty of other avenues for 
attack, including by insiders in a constant churn of 
crew turnover. 
 
3.2 Cyber Issues in Port Operations 
 
While ships at sea present a peculiar case in what 
may be considered operational technology (OT) 
cybersecurity, operations on land are quite different. 
While shipboard systems may largely be 
disconnected while at sea, port systems are largely 
interconnected and often widely exposed to the 
Internet. And what complicates their cybersecurity 
even more is that ports are incredibly heterogenous in 
ownership, operational, and technological 
composition. Coast Guard port inspectors reputedly 
quip, “If you’ve seen one port, you’ve seen a port.” 
Ports are often owned by local or regional 
governments, operated by a commercial operators, 
and served by myriad firms and offices who make the 
port work. Consider the Port of Houston, one of the 
nation’s largest, and the most energy-related port in 
the United States (more on that later). Along the 52-
mile Houston Ship Channel is the Port of Houston 
and its Port Authority (PHA), a mix of publicly- and 
privately-operated shipping terminals, and other port 
facilities, 150 different ones in total. It is home to the 
second and third largest oil refineries in the US and 
considered the primary energy port in the country. 
Some 260 million short tons of cargo and more than 
two million twenty-foot equivalent cargo containers 
passed through it in 2018. 
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It is also a very highly automated and networked 
port. And at the core of the digital operations is 
something called Navis. Navis is an interconnected 
suite of software; 
 
[D]esigned to manage all facets of terminal and cargo 
operations; it employs, among other things, optical 
character recognition to scan cargo and manage its 
movement. When cargo exits the port by truck or rail, 
not only does NAVIS [sic] electronically log the cargo 
out and thus simultaneously functioning as part of 
PHA’s security access control system, it also generates 
billing invoices for PHA. PHA’s gantry cranes, fuel 
farms, and even its HVAC systems are networked 
[16]. 
 
Thinking like a good bad guy, if so much of the 
Port of Houston’s daily operations are largely 
dependent on the Navis software, then that is 
probably also an excellent target if the aim is to steal 
from or disrupt the port. Has Navis been 
compromised or been found vulnerable? Yes, in 
2016, a SQL-injection flaw (a vulnerability found in 
a database service) was found in Navis software. The 
US Department of Homeland Security’s now defunct 
Industrial Control Systems–Computer Emergency 
Response Team (ICS-CERT) reported a previously 
unknown vulnerability and Navis released a patch for 
it. The vulnerability could have been exploited by a 
novice attacker [Q]. 
Navis has published a library of white papers on 
enhancing port efficiency. They have titles like A 
New Frontier: Business Intelligence, Big Data & the 
Impact on the Global Supply Chain and Port of the 
Future: A Sense of Wonder. None of its white papers 
cover the topic of cybersecurity. 
Although Navis and other port system software 
may have a central role in operations, the systems of 
many companies and government agencies also 
interconnect at major ports like Houston. These 
organizations run email systems, web servers, 
databases, and all manner of OT systems having to 
do with port operations. Some of the firms 
participating in port operations are among the largest 
corporations or conglomerates in the world, but 
others are far smaller. 
What this means is that getting all the actors 
involved in the operation of a large US cargo port to 
adopt a framework or set of practices regarding 
cybersecurity is difficult. As the Maersk cyberattack 
illustrated, the loss of even one major firm’s system 
at a large port may bring operations to a screeching 
halt. Of course there are many things that may occur 
to disrupt port operations. 
Again, port cybersecurity is different than ship 
cybersecurity. The targets aboard ships that bad guys 
care most about are likely those related to navigation 
and propulsion, both highly automated in 
contemporary merchant vessels. But in ports, there 
are many more points of entry to interconnected port 
systems. Modern port systems talk to railroad 
systems, and Navis has software, “to automatically 
route railcars to hub assignments and plan train load 
sequences” [17]. 
What this amounts to is a scenario in which the 
purveyors of port operations computer software and 
automation drive to enhance interoperability and 
operational efficiency as their primary activity. This 
drive for efficiency is acceptable, however, 
automation rife with cyber vulnerabilities may be 
exploited by malicious actors. Such exploits must be 
countered by law, policy, and technology. How 
government and the private sector cooperate on 
preventing cyberattack is critical to the ongoing 
function of the global maritime system. 
 
4. Law, the Sea, and Cyberspace 
 
A fundamental issue pertaining to the law in sea 
is the concept of jurisdiction or the power of a court 
or locale to regulate persons, objects, or conduct 
under their law. Because the world’s oceans are 
international, there is an issue of who has jurisdiction 
in matters occurring on the oceans. The United 
Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) 
attempts to establish a legal framework for the 
peaceful, cooperative use of the seas. UNCLOS 
replaced other UN initiatives with this framework. 
UNCLOS binds only those member countries of the 
UN and establishes jurisdiction for each country as 
12 nautical miles (13.8 miles) from the coastline with 
a 200-mile exclusive economic zones.   
However, multiple countries claim jurisdiction 
based on their own laws. United States Law, for 
example,  claims that the: 
 
Special territorial and maritime jurisdiction of the 
United States includes: (1) The high seas, any other 
waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 
of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any 
particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or 
in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to 
any corporation created by or under the laws of the 
United States or of any State, Territory, District, or 
possession thereof, when such vessel is within the 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United 
States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular 
state. [19]  
 
The issue of jurisdiction is especially 
problematic when it comes to cyberattacks. Does 
jurisdiction refer to the originating nation of the 
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attacker? The nation of the target? What is a nation is 
used as an intermediary in the attack? Can multiple 
nations claim jurisdictions? Unfortunately, the 
current status of the law remains fragmented with 
attempts to re-use existing laws and regulations into 
cyber attack scenarios the challenges to our current 
civil law framework and in more particular our 
maritime law legal framework center upon the 
application of existing legal concepts.  This general 
lack of jurisdiction over hackers presents another 
issue.  What if the damage from the cyberattack is not 
physical and the lack of physical damage arising 
from a successful Information Technology (IT) 
environment cyberattack are legal issues difficult to 
place within our current civil law framework. In 
short, the lack of physicality in an IT environment 
cyberattack presents challenges to our existing civil 
law framework.  
Another attempt to regulate internationally is 
with the Tallinn 2.0 Manual for International Law 
Regarding Cyber Operations [20]. The title of this 
document is problematic. First, it is not international 
law but rather an attempt by NATO to define rules 
regarding cyber operations binding among NATO 
countries.  Secondly, the term “cyber operations” is 
misleading as, on its face, it seems to mean 
transactions related to cyberspace, but in reality is 
synonymous with cyberwar.   
The Tallinn Manual establishes a basis for 
sovereignty, due diligence, jurisdiction, and 
international responsibility and these uses this basis 
to prescribe laws for air, sea, and space.  Its chapter 
on the Law of the Sea promulgating ten rules based 
on the recognized 200-mile economic zone.  Both the 
Tallinn Manual and UNCLOS are limited based on 
their ability to control the members of their 
respective groups.  As cyberattacks become more 
common against maritime assets, it will be up to the 
international courts to determine the effect of 
regulations and laws, and if these courts actually have 
the power to regulate.   
 
5. Relevant Public Policy 
 
As mentioned above, protection of the maritime 
system in the wake of the September 11 attacks on 
the United States and elsewhere has largely been 
aimed at protecting the physical security and integrity 
of cargo operations. Planning in port and shipboard 
security has largely been aimed at thwarting terror 
threats (smuggling of nuclear weapon or radiological 
components, other weapons, piracy, etc.) not cyber 
ones. That said, cybersecurity, or at least 
cybersecurity risk management has received attention 
from US national policymaking bodies as well as 
international organizations and associations. 
 
5.1 US Cyber Security Policy Guidance 
 
In the United States, there are sixteen critical 
infrastructure sectors. These sectors cover cyber as 
well as physical security. The cybersecurity of ships 
and ports falls under the DHS’s Transportation 
Systems Sector (TSS). That sector covers not only 
maritime issues, but also highways, rail, aviation, 
pipelines, and postal operations. The TSS plan was 
released by DHS in 2015. It covers a great number of 
industries, and identifies the Coast Guard as the lead 
agency for maritime safety and security, including 
cybersecurity. This status is the point of origin 
cybersecurity strategy produced by the USCG. In 
addition, the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) 
maintains an Office of Maritime Security which has 
added cybersecurity to its portfolio. 
Establishing the path for securing systems 
relevant to maritime operations from cyberattack has 
become a priority in the US. US policy on 
cybersecurity for the MTS is still developing, but was 
outlined in the US Coast Guard Cyber Strategy. The 
strategy rests on three pillars: defending cyberspace; 
enabling operations; and protecting infrastructure. 
That final piece is where the Coast Guard places the 
MTS mission, stating: 
 
Maritime critical infrastructure and the MTS are vital 
to our economy, national security, and national 
defense. The MTS includes ocean carriers, coastwise 
shipping along our shores, the Western rivers and 
Great Lakes, and the nation’s ports and terminals. 
Cyber systems enable the MTS to operate with 
unprecedented speed and efficiency. Those same 
cyber systems also create potential vulnerabilities. as 
the maritime transportation Sector Specific agency (as 
defined by the national infrastructure protection plan), 
the Coast Guard must lead the unity of effort required 
to protect maritime critical infrastructure from attacks, 
accidents, and disasters [21]. 
 
The US Coast Guard’s strategy heavily 
emphasizes risk management. This makes a great 
deal of sense, as shippers and other operators in the 
maritime system have a long history of managing risk 
and employing insurances to mitigate risk of loss 
(UK insurer Lloyd’s has been in operation since 
1686).  
The Coast Guard’s strategy rests on two legs: (1) 
assessment of risk through promotion of cyber risk 
awareness and management; and (2) prevention via 
the reduction of vulnerabilities in the MTS. This 
strategy is likely in need of revision, it was released 
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in 2015, and it’s concrete objectives – risk 
assessment tools and methodologies; cybersecurity 
information sharing; cyber vulnerability reduction; 
and cybersecurity education and training – align with 
the early stage of cybersecurity development found in 
the maritime system.  
 
5.2 International Cybersecurity Guidance 
 
Beyond US policy, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) also has begun to stir in 
approaching the issue of how cybersecurity impacts 
its role at the UN specialized agency concerned with, 
“the global standard-setting authority for the safety, 
security and environmental performance of 
international shipping.” The IMO issued guidance on 
maritime cyber risk management in 2017 [22]. It 
detailed eight areas of where vulnerable systems can 
be found, including: 
▪ Bridge systems; 
▪ Cargo handling and management systems; 
▪ Propulsion and machinery management and 
power control systems; 
▪ Access control systems; 
▪ Passenger servicing and management 
systems; 
▪ Passenger facing public networks; 
▪ Administrative and crew welfare systems; 
and 
▪ Communication systems.  
The IMO’s primary tools for guidance emanate 
from other bodies including: The Guidelines on 
Cyber Security Onboard Ships; the International 
Organization for Standardization and International 
Electrotechnical Commission ISO/IEC 27001 
standard on security techniques; and the US National 
Institute for Standards and Technology’s Framework 
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. 
While the latter two documents are applied broadly to 
many areas of commercial activity, the Guidelines on 
Cyber Security Onboard Ships (GCSOS) is a much 
more specific one and deserves greater attention. 
Where the USCG has hung its hat on a strategy 
for cybersecurity in the MTS, GCSOS is an attempt 
to move toward an industry guidebook for securing 
shipboard systems. Therefore it draws significant 
attention on a set of initiatives that can protect 
maritime activity. It represents the combined work of 
nine major associations involved in maritime 
shipping and transport. Furthermore it is focused on 
the cybersecurity of ships, not ports. 
 The GCSOS is a seven part document that may 
be best described as a handbook on cybersecurity 
related to ships engaged in commercial activity. It 
identifies the primary concern regarding 
cybersecurity to be found in this area:  
 
As technology continues to develop, information 
technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) 
onboard ships are being networked together – and 
more frequently connected to the internet.  
 
The document also identifies the two major areas 
of concern regarding a cyberattack upon a ship; its 
navigation and propulsion systems. Without those 
functioning properly, safe shipboard operations can’t 
be guaranteed [23]. 
Because the GCSOS is essentially a handbook or 
perhaps even a primer, it covers the full gamut of 
cybersecurity issues from threats to response and 
recovery in a relatively brief document. Nonetheless, 
it stands as significant contribution to cybersecurity 
in the maritime system. Moving beyond the primer 
phase of cybersecurity in the maritime system will 
necessitate new approaches and investments, detailed 
in the final section of this paper. 
 
6. Conclusion and Prescriptions 
 
Maritime cybersecurity has been identified as an  
issue of some importance in the global cybersecurity 
agenda. It does not rank as high as energy or power 
issues, nor have the maturity of corporate and 
government response found in the financial sector, 
but it is on the agenda.  
We see the state of maritime cybersecurity as 
this. There is some emphasis on ships, but less on 
ports, and less still on things connected to ports. All 
matter and with many, many points of connection to 
port systems, establishing international, industry-
wide standards will likely require extensive 
coordination and expenditure of intellect. 
Nonetheless, activity can be undertaken to secure the 
maritime system by policy and through educational 
endeavor. 
 
6.1 Directions for Public Policy 
 
Obviously maritime cybersecurity issues are 
inherently international or global in nature. Their 
remedy will require an investment by stakeholders in 
both government and the maritime industry with 
significant input from players in shipbuilding, 
maritime operations, port activities, and other 
functions that may be found in the maritime system. 
If mere regulation was the answer to 
cybersecurity issues in this area of endeavor or any 
other, the job would be one from policymakers alone. 
Regulation will be only a part of the process of 
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increasing cybersecurity capacity. Nonetheless, when 
useful frameworks, guidance, rules, and international 
law may be promulgated, they should be. We just 
need to be cognizant of the rapid change that may 
occur as a result of technological innovation. It may 
be difficult to forecast the future vulnerabilities 
produced, but certainly this does not constitute a pass 
for policy action. 
Policymakers concerned with addressing the 
cybersecurity issues to be found in the maritime 
system must recognize that a workforce of experts in 
cybersecurity able to address the issues faced by 
shipping lines, naval architects, automation software 
developers, or port operators will need to be created 
and grown. Its beginnings will stem from the tiniest 
of cadres now extant. 
The maritime cybersecurity workforce will be 
composed of professionals who understand the 
programming and operation of computer systems as 
well as having an understanding of the multiple areas 
of expertise found across the maritime system. For 
instance, addressing issues in ship propulsion systems 
requires skills in both the operations of those systems 
as well as the cybersecurity problems that arise in 
their development and operation. The same would be 
true of systems for tracking cargo or navigation. 
 
6.2 Research and Education 
 
The workforce issue will necessitate training and 
education of varying depths. Some professionals will 
no doubt receive cybersecurity education and training 
at mid-career while others, if demand is sufficient, 
will enter the workforce with specialist degrees 
combining maritime and cybersecurity curriculum. 
At a deeper level, experts from industry, government, 
and academia may well need to collaborate around 
centers for interchange of expertise and research 
activity. This is already present in cyber activities for 
everything from the power grid to the banking 
system. 
In the United States, a maritime cybersecurity 
research and development capability should be 
established along the lines of Department of Energy 
(DOE) cybersecurity organizations across its 
infrastructure of national labs. Considerable 
investment has been undertaken by the DOE in 
cybersecurity for the electricity power grid as well as 
other process control systems. DOE has made 
considerable investment at its Idaho National Lab 
(INL) in cybersecurity for Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, found in all 
manner of industrial applications. 
Both DHS and MARAD have grants programs in 
place for enhancing security of the MTS and ports. 
One official with whom we discussed this paper 
described one of the DHS program’s outcomes being 
multiple sales of updated fireboats to major ports. 
This was verified in our research of DHS granting 
activity. How government funding can be coupled 
with industry initiatives should be another area for 
activity in the cybersecurity of the maritime system. 
Few areas of critical infrastructure are more ripe 
for strategy and investment related to cybersecurity 
protection than the maritime system. In addition, 
research should be undertaken on the protection of 
computer systems in both shipboard and port 
operations so that cyberattacks will be less damaging 
or debilitating to maritime trade. 
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